Introduction
How many different states of knowledge are there with regard to some given fact, when several agents are involved? This question has some bearing article no. 0084 on the problem of naming states of knowledge. If there are only finitely or denumerably many states then they can have finite names, in a language with a finite or countable alphabet. But if the cardinality of the set of these states is that of the continuum, then it is impossible to name them all, in much the same way that we cannot name each point in our physical space. In such a case, the idea that agents know the``epistemic model'' that describes their knowledge should be interpreted very cautiously. If the model is rich enough, then``know'' in this context does not mean that agents can talk (in ordinary language) about every state.
The answer to our question is that there is indeed a continuum of different knowledge states, and therefore we cannot name them all. This answer is by no means novel. Aumann [1] , in a set of widely circulating but unpublished lecture notes, constructed, in a rather non-trivial way, a continuum of different states of knowledge in an interactive environment. Here we present a very simple construction of such a continuum using an epistemic operator which we call``Knowing whether.'' The standard knowledge operator, by contrast, is``Knowing that.'' By saying``Alice knows whether the hatter is mad'' we mean that either she knows that the hatter is mad or she knows that the hatter is not mad. Thus, while``Alice knows that the hatter is mad'' implies that the hatter is indeed mad,``Alice knows whether the hatter is mad'' is just about Alice's state of mind, with no implication regarding the sanity of the hatter.
We are making no philosophical claim about the primacy of either epistemic operator or the``correct'' way to model knowledge. On the contrary. Both operators can be used in the same model since each can be expressed in terms of the other. Thus,``Bob knows whether X '' is the same as``Bob knows that X or he knows that not X,'' while``Bob knows that X '' is exactly the same as``X, and Bob knows whether X.'' The question of which operator to use is one of convenience.
What this paper demonstrates is that in some cases``Knowing whether'' is much more convenient to use than``Knowing that.'' When one considers sentences (or events, depending on the formal framework) in which`K nowing that'' operators of several agents alternate, as in``Bob knows that Alice does not know that he knows . . .,'' one discovers that the logical relationship between such sentences can be rather complicated. This complexity is the reason why the construction of a continuum of states is cumbersome when the operator``Knowing that'' is used as a building block. These complications disappear when``whether'' is used instead of`t hat.'' The logical relationship between sentences formed by alternating`K nowing whether'' operators of different agents is extremely simple; they are logically independent. This simplicity is at the base of the uncomplicated construction we present here. The usefulness of the``Knowing whether'' operator in a different context is demonstrated in Heifetz and Samet [3] .
The next section describes the formal framework of a state space with partitions, which is the standard model in game theory and economics. In Section 3 we show the difficulties one encounters when dealing with alternating``Knowing that'' operators. In Section 4 we introduce thè`K nowing whether'' operator and construct a continuum of knowledge states.
Stating the Result Formally
We model interactive knowledge in a standard way, (see for example the survey, Geanakoplos [2] ) by means of an information structure (0, 6 1 , 6 2 ), where 0 is a state space and 6 1 , 6 2 are partitions of 0 representing the information that agents 1 and 2 have about the states. Subsets of 0 are called events. The complementary event to E, 0"E, is denoted by cE (read`n ot E''). For | # 0 and i=1, 2 denote by 6 i (|) the unique element of 6 i containing |. We define two knowledge operators K 1 and K 2 for agents 1 and 2,
Fix a nontrivial event X. In order to describe all events that express interactive knowledge concerning X, we construct inductively a sequence B 0 , B 1 , B 2 .. . of finite Boolean algebra 2 of events. B 0 :=[3, X, cX, 0], is the Boolean algebra generated by X. For n 1, B n is the Boolean algebra generated by
The events in B are said to be ( finitely) 3 generated by X. Such events correspond to sentences constructed using the phrases``X,''``not,''``or,''`a nd,''``1 knows,'' and``2 knows.'' A typical event generated by X is, for example,
With some abuse of language we call expressions like (V) events generated by X, although strictly speaking such expressions describe events only for a given information structure and event X. Some facts about X and knowledge concerning X, which may be quite complex, can be true in one state and false in another one. In such a case we say that the two states are separated by X. Formally, Definition 2.1. Two states | and |$ are separated by X if there exists an event E which is generated by X, such that | # E and |$ # cE.
One may wonder how many states can be in an information structure (0, 6 1 , 6 2 ) such that an event X separates any two of them. We prove in Section 4: Theorem 2.2. There exists an information structure (0, 6 1 , 6 2 ) and an event X 0, such that all the states in 0 are separated by X, and 0 has the cardinality of the continuum.
Clearly the cardinality of such a set of states cannot be greater than 2
+0
since there are only a denumerable number of events generated by X. Theorem 2.2 shows that this upper bound is indeed attained.
Why Isn't it Straightforward?
At first glance, the existence of a continuum of states describing interactive knowledge of X seems rather obvious. Consider the following construction.
Let (E 1 , E 2 , ...) be a list (finite or infinite) of events generated by X. We say that the list is consistent if there is an information structure (0, 6 1 , 6 2 ), an event X 0, and a state | # 0 such that all the events in the list are true in | (that is, if the intersection of all the events in the list is non-empty).
Consider now the two lists,
Clearly, both are consistent, expressing the idea that the truth of X does not imply knowledge of X or lack of it. We can extend each of the two lists in two ways by applying knowledge of agent 2, or lack of it, to the last event in the list. Thus we obtain four lists,
from the first one, and
from the second. It is easy to see that all four lists are consistent by constructing an appropriate information structure. Applying now K 1 and cK 1 to the last event in each list we have already eight lists which again are consistent. We call a list of this type a K-list. We can go on, ad infinitum, generating infinitely many infinite K-lists, and the cardinality of this set of lists is 2 +0 .
The-fault in this line of proof is that not every K-list is consistent, as the following example shows. Consider the K-list (E 1 , ..., E 5 ) defined by
This list is inconsistent; that is, for each information structure and event X the intersection of the events in the list is empty. Indeed, the intersection of the third and fifth events is already empty. We demonstrate this by a simple story followed by a rigorous proof.
Adam and Eve are waiting for a phone call from Godot. When finally Godot calls, only Adam is at home and he receives the call, an event which we denote by X. Obviously the event E 2 =K 1 X holds in this case when we designate Adam as agent 1. Adam leaves a message on Eve's answering machine, telling her about the call he received. But Eve does not check her answering machine and so clearly the event E 3 =cK 2 K 1 X is true, where Eve is agent 2. Adam does not know that Eve did not check her answering machine and thus the event E 4 =cK 1 cK 2 K 1 X is also true.
Suppose now that Mr. Beckett, who is aware of all these events, brings to Eve's attention that Adam does not know that she does not know that he, Adam, received the call. In other words, Mr. Beckett tells her that E 4 holds true and thus the event E 5 =K 2 cK 1 cK 2 K 1 X is now true. Is E 3 still correct? That is, knowing E 4 , is Eve still ignorant of Adam receiving the call? Certainly not. Had Adam not received the call, he would have known for sure that Eve could not have possibly known that he received it, contrary to E 4 . Therefore, knowing E 4 , Eve concludes that Adam received the call; that is, she knows E 2 and hence E 3 is false. Thus E 5 contradicts E 3 , or formally, E 5 & E 3 =<. Now we state and prove formally:
Proposition 3.1. In any information structure and for any event X,
Proof. To prove it we record three properties of the operators K i that follow readily from the definition. Let K stand for either K 1 or K 2 , then for any events E and F: (a) KE E, (b) KcKE=cKE, (c) if E F then KE KF.
Now by (a), K 2 K 1 X K1X, and therefore by taking complements cK 1 X cK 2 K 1 X. Hence by (c),
to the left-hand side of this inclusion we have cK 1 X K 1 cK 2 K 1 X. Taking complements again yields cK 1 cK 2 K 1 X K 1 X. Finally by (c) we conclude that K 2 cK 1 cK 2 K 1 X K 2 K 1 X which completes the proof. K Thus not all K-lists of length 5 are consistent. The list we examined is the shortest inconsistent one. The next new 4 consistent K-list is of length 9. Does the set of all consistent K-lists have the cardinality of the continuum? We do not know the answer, and it seems that to prove or disprove it is not straightforward. Aumann [1] , constructs another continuum of consistent lists, but the construction is rather tricky and does not have the simplicity of the, alas, faulty K-lists. In the next section we construct an even simpler set of lists that does the job.
Knowing Whether
Define the operators J 1 and J 2 by
for each event E. We read J i E as``i knows whether E '' meaning that agent i knows whether E is true or not, without saying whether E is true or not. Obviously J i E is the union of all elements of 6 i which are entirely included in either E or cE. It is easy to see that the operator K i can be expressed in terms of J i , namely, K i E=E & J i E. Note that the operators J i are invariant under complementation; i.e., J i E=J i cE for each event E.
Consider now lists of events of the same form as the K-lists of Section 3, only with the operators J i replacing the K i operators. We call such a list a J-list. A typical J-list is, for example,
But in light of the complementation invariance of the J operators we can omit all complementation signs which do not precede an event. Thus the previous list is the same as
Thus each event in a J-list is generated by applying alternately J 1 and J 2 or J 2 and J 1 , starting from X, and then possibly taking the complement. We show now that, as opposed to the K-lists, all 2 +0 infinite J-lists are consistent. This follows from the proof of Theorem 2.2 below.
Proof of Theorem 2.2. Let 0 be the set of all pairs of infinite sequences of 0's and 1's with the same starting digit; that is,
Clearly, 0 has the cardinality of the continuum.
Let the event X be the set of all states in which a 0 =b 0 =1. Define an equivalence relation t 1 on states by 
With this lemma the theorem is proved. Any two different states in 0 differ by either the a k th or the b k th coordinate for some k 0. If k=0, the two states are separated by the event X itself (here we use the equality a 0 =b 0 in the definition of a state). If k 1, then by the lemma the two states are separated by some event generated by X. K Lemma 4.1 also shows that every J-list is consistent. Indeed all the events in such a list hold true in all states with coordinates given by the events in the list according to the lemma. Proving the lemma is now straightforward.
Proof of Lemma 4.1. We prove by induction on k. For k=0 the equality in the lemma holds by the definition of X. It suffices now to show that for all k 1, Conversely, assume that | Â [a k =1]. Let |$ be the state which is identical to | in all coordinates except b k&1 . Then |$t 1 |, which implies that | Â K 1 [b k&1 =;] for both ;=0 and ;=1. K
